Ghana's Banks Under Scrutiny for Failing Financial Integrity

A Ghanaian national, known as Abu Trica, is facing up to 20 years in a US prison for allegedly masterminding an $8 million romance scam, sparking fresh outrage over cyber fraud in Ghana.

While public attention understandably focuses on the accused, experts say the case highlights a critical systemic failure: weaknesses in Ghana’s financial regulations that allow such scams to flourish until flagged by international authorities.

Cyber fraud, often perceived as an online issue, is fundamentally a financial crime. Successful scams of this scale require the involvement of banks – accounts are opened, funds received, transferred, and ultimately withdrawn. The crucial question, therefore, is not just identifying perpetrators, but understanding how the financial system failed to intercept the illicit funds.

Banks are legally obligated to act as gatekeepers against financial crime in advanced economies. Ghana’s banking laws, particularly Section 3 of the Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930), mandate the Bank of Ghana to ensure the “safety, soundness and stability” of the banking system, a mandate inextricably linked to financial integrity.

Section 56 of Act 930 empowers the Bank of Ghana to intervene when a bank’s practices are deemed “unsafe, unsound or pose a threat” to the financial system. Cyber-enabled fraud clearly falls within this purview, yet cases like the alleged Abu Trica scam suggest a delayed or ineffective response.

The Bank of Ghana’s Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Guidelines require a risk-based approach to customer and transaction assessment. “Enhanced due diligence” is mandated for higher-risk scenarios, including unusual transaction patterns, large foreign inflows, or activities inconsistent with a customer’s financial profile.

According to the guidelines, a customer receiving substantial, unexplained foreign transfers should automatically trigger increased scrutiny. However, the movement of funds through multiple accounts, sometimes across different banks, before any action is taken, indicates a significant gap in implementation.

The weakness extends beyond initial customer onboarding to continuous transaction monitoring. While the Bank of Ghana’s Risk Management Directive requires banks to monitor for financial crime risks, many still rely on simple rule-based thresholds, flagging only large individual transactions.

“Fraud networks are sophisticated and deliberately structure transactions to avoid detection, sending funds in smaller amounts or rapidly cycling them through accounts,” explains financial crime analyst, Kwesi Amoako. “Dynamic, behaviour-based monitoring systems are essential to identify these patterns.”

Banks are also legally required to file Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) with the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) whenever they “know, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect” criminal activity. This low threshold is intentional, prioritizing caution.

However, delayed reporting renders the AML system ineffective. If funds are withdrawn or transferred before a report is filed, the opportunity for prevention is lost, turning enforcement into a reactive measure.

The Payment Systems and Services Act, 2019 (Act 987) further strengthens the regulatory framework, holding payment service providers accountable for the integrity of electronic transactions. The Act empowers the Bank of Ghana to issue directives to ensure financial stability and consumer protection.

Despite these robust legal tools, enforcement intensity remains a concern. Unlike the substantial fines and repercussions faced by banks in Europe and North America for AML failures, penalties in Ghana are often modest, fostering a culture of compliance as a mere formality.

The consequences of persistent cyber fraud extend beyond individual cases. It damages Ghana’s international reputation, jeopardizes correspondent banking relationships, and increases scrutiny on legitimate financial transactions, ultimately impacting businesses and citizens.

Addressing this requires more than just rhetoric. The Bank of Ghana must demonstrate a commitment to enforcing its AML/CFT directives, banks must invest in advanced transaction monitoring systems, and KYC procedures must evolve into continuous risk assessment. Enhanced intelligence sharing, coordinated by the FIC, is also crucial.

Ultimately, prevention is more effective than prosecution. As long as illicit funds move faster than oversight, cyber fraud will continue to thrive. Ghana’s laws are in place; the question is whether policy action will finally match the scale of the problem.

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