Ghana's Banks Under Scrutiny for Failing Financial Integrity

The recent disclosure by the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) that a Ghanaian national, known as Abu Trica, is facing up to 20 years imprisonment in the United States for allegedly masterminding an $8 million romance scam has sparked public outrage over cyber fraud.

While public discussion understandably centers on the accused, this case highlights a critical systemic failure: persistent weaknesses in Ghana’s financial institutions that allow such fraud to flourish undetected until intervention by foreign authorities. Often framed as an online crime, cyber fraud is fundamentally a financial one. No scheme of this scale can succeed without the involvement of banks – accounts must be opened, funds received, transferred, and ultimately withdrawn.

In advanced financial systems, banks are legally mandated as gatekeepers, a role reinforced by regulation and sanctions. Ghana’s Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930) reflects this, tasking the Bank of Ghana with ensuring the “safety, soundness and stability” of the banking system. Financial integrity is integral to this mandate. Section 56 of Act 930 empowers the Bank of Ghana to take supervisory action against banks whose practices are “unsafe, unsound or pose a threat.” Cyber-enabled fraud clearly falls within this purview.

The Bank of Ghana’s Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Guidelines require a risk-based approach, assessing customers and transactions based on their risk profile. “Enhanced due diligence” is mandated for higher-risk situations, such as unusual transaction patterns or large foreign inflows. A customer receiving substantial, unexplained foreign transfers should trigger immediate scrutiny. However, the Abu Trica case suggests this scrutiny is often delayed, allowing funds to move through multiple accounts before action is taken.

The core weakness isn’t just in opening accounts, but in ongoing transaction monitoring. The BoG’s Risk Management Directive requires banks to identify and control financial crime risks. Yet, many institutions rely on simple rule-based thresholds – flagging only large transactions – rather than advanced behavioural analytics. Fraudsters exploit this by structuring transactions in smaller amounts or rapidly cycling funds. Romance scams, in particular, are adept at evading these basic checks.

Banks are legally obligated to file Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) with the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) whenever they “know, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect” criminal activity. This low threshold – requiring only suspicion, not proof – is intentional. However, delayed reporting renders the AML system ineffective. Once funds are withdrawn or transferred abroad, prevention becomes impossible, and enforcement shifts to a reactive mode.

The Payment Systems and Services Act, 2019 (Act 987) further strengthens the regulatory framework, holding payment service providers accountable for the integrity of electronic transactions. It empowers the Bank of Ghana to issue directives to protect financial stability and consumers. The issue isn’t a lack of legal tools, but their forceful application. Unlike the substantial fines and prosecutions seen in Europe and North America for AML failures, enforcement in Ghana remains relatively lenient.

The consequences of persistent cyber fraud extend beyond individual cases. It damages Ghana’s international reputation, jeopardizes correspondent banking relationships, and increases scrutiny on legitimate transactions. The costs are borne by businesses and citizens through delays, increased compliance costs, and eroded trust in the financial system. The benefits accrue to a small number of fraudsters, while the losses are widespread.

To effectively combat cyber fraud, the Bank of Ghana must rigorously enforce its AML/CFT directives, utilizing the full powers granted under Acts 930 and 987. Banks must invest in modern, behaviour-based transaction monitoring systems, moving beyond simple compliance software. Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures must evolve into continuous risk assessment, as envisioned by the BoG. Finally, intelligence sharing between banks, coordinated by the FIC, must become standard practice.

Arrests generate headlines, but systemic change requires prevention. As long as illicit funds move faster than oversight, cyber fraud will continue. Ghana’s laws are clear, the Bank of Ghana’s mandates are explicit, and banks’ responsibilities are well-defined. The challenge now lies in implementation, enforcement, and accountability. In the fight against cyber fraud, banks are the first line of defence, and policy action must reflect this reality.

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